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The Polar Regions and the Law of the Sea
HE

POLAR

REGIONS

PROVIDE

a

unique

setting

for

the development of international law, in particular, the law
of the sea. "The North Pole rests on 4300 meters of water covered by moving ice about 3 meters thick, whereas the South Pole
rests on nearly 3300 meters of land covered by a solid ice cap
which may be 1500 meters thick." 1 The ice is in constant flux
while forming its own unique ocean environment. The physical
environments of the Arctic and Antarctic present their own special legal problems which call for prompt, novel solutions. There
are no international institutions and few laws to govern these vast
and once remote areas. These regions, that once seemed so inaccessible, are now gradually being opened by our emerging
polar technology so that more ambitious research projects, mineral exploitation,2 and even tourism 3 have become possible.
What is involved is a new territory rapidly becoming accessible to any nation or private enterprise with the requisite resources.
The question is whether our present institutions will
suffice in this new environment, or whether new methods will
have to be devised to ensure that the coexistence of many nations
in these areas is to be orderly and peaceful.4 Perhaps as new
principles are developed to deal with the polar regions, they can
be applied equally to other aspects of the law of the sea. Today,
scientific research is the primary activity in the polar regions.
This research provides an important reference point from which
to explore the organizations and regulations that will be necessary
for the safe and equitable exploitation of the regions.
1).

PHARAND,

THE

LAW

OF

THE

SEA

OF THE

ARCTIC,

WITH

SPECIAL

REFER-

151 (1973).
Pharand also suggests that the Arctic and Antarctic have different physical characteristics.
He says, "Not only are the
Arctic and Antarctic located at opposite ends of one planet, but they are essetially opposite in their very nature; whereas the Antarctic is a continent
surrounded by a vast maritime belt, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by a vast
and nearly continuous continental belt."
2 K. Bertrand, Optional Considerations: the Historical Background, in SCIENCE,
ENCE

TO CANADA

AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR REGIONS 18 (G. Schatz ed. 1974).
Bertrand points out that the discovery of resources in combination with an energy
crisis shows that a harsh environment did not deter the drilling for oil on the
North Slope of Alaska for very long.
3 Id. Tourist operations are operated from the United States and Argentina
to Antarctica.
4 P. Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117-119 (1947).
TECHNOLOGY
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A resurgence of interest in these areas raises old questions as
to what law is to govern the "last found regions of the world on a
firm and lasting basis of international comity." 5 How are the
two legal concepts of freedom of the seas and territorial sovereignty
to be applied to these regions that are neither sea nor land in the
ordinary sense?
It has been suggested that the principles of the law of the sea
are not applicable to the ice of the polar regions, and that territorial acquisition of ice is possible in the same way as acquisition
of land. Others say that the states adjacent to the Arctic ought
to exercise at least some form of national jurisdiction and control
6
over this territory.
Territorial sovereignty denotes the bundle of legal rights which
a state exercises over land. Three criteria are necessary in international law for an effective claim to territory. They are discovery,
effective occupation and public notice. 7 The occupation required
must not be merely symbolic or fictitious but must be "effec"Effective" occupation requires, "something in the nature
tive.-''
of a permanent settlement, a colonization.""
Permanent habitation in these frozen environments would be
very difficult at this time. Even if the principle of occupation
could be applied to the ice-covered land of Antarctica, how could
it be similarily applied to the frozen seas of these regions which
are not stationary? 10
These assertions of territorial sovereignty tend to ignore the
fact that the water masses and pack ice of the polar regions are
not stagnant cohesive bodies of ice, but flowing masses that tend
to fuse and split endlessly. Pharand describes this phenomenon
as follows:
The water masses under the ice cover are basically the same
as in any other ocean. True, there is an undersea mountain
extending from the Siberian Islands to Ellesmere Island, and
the sea floor reveals a physiographic complex of basins and
ridges, but there is nonetheless a displacement of water masses
as in other oceans. . . .The pack ice consists of ice floes
5 E. H. Wall, The Polar Regions in International Law, 1 INT'L L. Q. 54 (1947).
L. ROLLAND, MAISON DE JEU ETABLIE SUR LES GLACES AU DELA DE LA LIMITE
DES EAUX TERRITORIALES 342, cited in D. PHARAND, supra note 1, at 146.
1 Island of Palmas Case (United States v. the Netherlands), Hague Reports
2d, (Scott) 83 (Pern. Ct. Arb. 1928).
8 E. H. Wall, supra note 5, at 55.
9 Lakhtine, Rights over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 704 (1930).
10E. H. Wall, supra note 5, at 55.
6
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averaging about three meters thick and covering approximately
90% of the Arctic Ocean; the floes or fragments of ice are generally in close contact. However, the ice within the pack is not
compact, uniform, permanent or immobile. The ice floes are
neither firmly packed nor joined together but are separated by
a number of leads or polynyas, which resemble lakes of open
water . . . these water openings account for roughly 10% of
the surface and are so numerous in the summer that the Arctic
Ocean really becomes marine in character . . . the ice floes are
not only in constant motion locally but also move around all over
the Arctic Ocean, a considerable proportion being carried outside completely."
The controversy concerning whether ice is considered the high
seas or land reaches a climax in Antarctica where ice occurs in
12
three different forms: pack ice, ice shelves, and ice sheets.
Bernhardt suggests that the ice that resembles land be governed
by the traditional legal principles governing land areas, and that
the remaining ice be governed by the principles of the law of the
sea. 13 There would be enormous difficulties in.drawing the dividing line between land and sea ice and this process would
greatly inhibit the formation of uniform principles to govern
effectively the Antarctic region.
If a polar regime of governing principles for the ice environment is to be formed, efficiency demands that all types of Antarctic ice be included in one system. The approach is preferable
to a division of the continent into different sectors based upon the
nature of the land or sea which comprise the individual sectors.
To follow a divided approach would pave the way for disagreement and disharmony among the nations interested in the Antarctic.
The question of national sovereignty and the applicability of
international conventions is unclear in the polar regions. As far
11D.

PHARAND,

supra note 1, at 151-56.

J. Bernhardt,

Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 330 (1975).
Bernhardt describes the differences and states:
Pack ice is generally categorized as sea ice, and is formed by the freezing
of sea water . . . Shelf ice, initially generically the same as pack ice,
forms on the surface of the sea, but normally in bays or other sheltered
areas. Such deposits may build up a shelf which remains attached to
the land for many years. Such shelf ice can reach thicknesses of 5001000 feet, as in the Ross Sea, and on its most seaward extremities is
subject to calving; that is, the breaking away of large pieces into the
sea. Ice sheets, on the other hand, are generally considered land ice,
and are formed on land by the freezing of fresh water or the compacting
of snow . ...
13 Id. at 348.
12
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as the Arctic is concerned, Pharand feels that the attitude of the
adjacent Arctic states is important to any discussion of the sov14
ereignty issue.
The practice of states has always played a significant role
in the evolution of international law. Often the influence of the
state supporting a particular theory will determine how quickly
or effectively a principle of international law will evolve.
As
Pharand says:
To use the imagery of Charles de Visscher in his discussion of
the importance of power in the formation of international law,
,some states are heavier than others and will thus mark the
'
path of their practice in a more definite and permanent way. 1
So that, if the state practice of both the United States and the
Soviet Union were to indicate that they do not consider the
freedom of the seas applicable to the Arctic Ocean, their practice might constitute an effective limitation on that fundamental
principle of international law. This does not mean that the
attitude of the other Arctic states is not important, but it is
necessarily less so; their attitude could increase or decrease the
importance of a practice followed by either of the two great powers or by both, but would hardly change the actual course of such
16
a practice.
One must examine the attitudes of the adjacent Arctic states to
assess whether the principle of freedom of the seas applies.
Even though it was a United States naval officer who first
hoisted the flag at the North Pole, the United States has made
no claim to the Arctic for itself nor has it recognized the claim of
any other nation. 7
As for the Soviet Union's position, Pharand points out that:
Although the Soviet jurists such as Sigrist, Lakhtine, and
Koroven have interpreted the sector theory to include ice
formations within the [Soviet Union's] sector, the government
of the U.S.S.R. does not appear to have subscribed to such an
extensive interpretation.
True, most of its research has been
done on the Soviet side of the Pole but, since it is impossible
to control ice stations, they sometimes take unexpected courses;
consequently a number of Soviet ice stations have drifted well
outside the Soviet sector. However, much more significant is
14D. PHARAND, supra note
15 C.

DE

VISSCHER,

1, at 145.

THfoPIES

ET

R9ALIT9S

EN

DROIT

INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC

177-98 (1955), as cited in D. PHARAND, supra note 1, at 168-69.
16 D. PHARAND, supra note 1, at 168-69.
17Id. at 169. See also, F. M. Auburn, International Law and Sea-Ice Jurisdiction
in the Arctic Ocean, 22 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 552-557 (1973).

[Vol. 8: 204

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

the fact that the U.S.S.R. has established a number of stations
well within the American sector north of Alaska. 18
Pharand's statement intimates that the Soviet Union does
not recognize the claims of other countries to the Arctic nor does
it necessarily advance any claim of its own. Pharand suggests
that the Soviets' lack of assertion of jurisdiction was illustrated
by the incident of August, 1967 when U.S. icebreakers were in
the seas north of the Soviet coast. The Soviet Union did not
really object to their presence until they tried to use the Vilkitsky
Strait, which it considers as lying within its territorial waters. 19
The official attitude of Canada is also unclear. Numerous
statements have been made by her ministers in the House of Commons to the effect that they support the idea of a Canadian sector which extends across the Arctic Ocean to the North Pole. 2°
Yet, upon examination of these statements it seems that these
ministers never meant to claim jurisdiction over the water and ice
of the Arctic. 21 But, as Pharand points out:
In these circumstances, it is somewhat surprising that the official maps prepared and issued by the Government continues
to show the 'boundary' of Canada as extending to the North
Pole ....
22 whatever might be the intent behind Canada's
continuing practice to show a polar sector on its maps, it would
seem reasonably clear that it is not in support of a claim of
sovereignty and, indeed, the sector theory per se can find no
basis in international law.23
Even though Canada's position is ambiguous, both major
powers, along with Norway and Denmark, refuse to claim sovereignty or recognize the claims of others. Therefore, the prin24
ciple of freedom of the seas seemingly does apply to the Arctic.
18Id.

at 190-91.

See also R. Reid,

the Waters of the Arctic, 12
the sector theory as "

The Canadian Claim to Sovereignty Over

CAN. YEARBOOK OF INT'L
.

L. 114 (1974).

Reid defines

. each country with a continental coastline auto-

matically falls heir to all the territory lying between its coastline and the North
Pole."
15D. PnARAND, supra note 1, at 191. For an account of this incident, see
D. Pharand, Soviet Union Warns United States Against Use of Northeast Passage,

62 AM. J.
20

INT'L

L. 927-35 (1968).

See Plischke,

Trans-Polar Aviation and Jurisdiction over Arctic Airspace, 37

AM. POL. Sci. REV. 999-1013 (1943).
21 D. PHARAND, supra note 1, at 171.
22 Political Map of Canada, 2 CAN.
in D. PHARAND, supra note 1, at 172.
23

D.

PHARAND,

2ANeither

YEARBOOK OF INT'L

L. (1967), as cited

supra note 1, at 172-73.

Norway nor Denmark seems to subscribe to the idea of a national
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The question of sovereignty in Antarctica is governed by the
Antarctic Treaty signed in 1959, and effective in 1961. The Treaty
did not clarify the sovereignty issues; it only maintained the status
quo as to national claims for 30 years.2 5
The sovereignty issues and claims in the polar regions are at
best unclear, and it is this uncertainty which will cause future
problems in fixing national rights and responsibilities in these
regions.
Scientific research and expeditions are possible areas
where ownership and control issues may arise.
At present,
scientific research is an important activity and a likely starting
point for discussion of the issues that will be involved in the development of these regions. Any principles or institutions that
are established to guarantee peaceful cooperation in scientific
research can be expanded to the other activities that are becoming technologically possible. It is stated that:
The old concept of freedom of the seas was fine as long as the
ocean was considered nearly worthless, except for cheap transportation or national defense. Management of the oceans for
the exploitation of the natural resources that it contains, or that
could be produced demands a clarification of ownership.26
The Antarctic Treaty has established some guidelines for
scientific research,27 but it leaves many questions unresolved.
Under the Antarctic Treaty a contracting party is presumed to
have jurisdiction over its nationals in the Antarctic, but the authors
of the treaty did not deal with the possibility of non-nationals in
the Antarctic or the rights of entrepreneurs or multinational
enterprises. 28 As Kenneth Bertrand points out, "One of the
concerns relating to potential legal difficulties in the Antarctic
sector of the Arctic, nor do they recognize the claims of others.

Neither country

has had the opportunity to make its official position known, but history indicates
that they regard the Arctic Ocean as open to all nations. This is so even though
it was a Norwegian explorer, Nansen, who first crossed the Arctic Ocean in
1893-1896. See PHARAND, supra note 1, at 175-76.
21 G. Schatz, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR REGIONS
1-2 (G. Schatz ed. 1974). As Schatz states:
The Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, was intended to defer action by
any contracting party to enlarge any "claim to territorial sovereignty"
or to prejudice the claims of another, and this moratorium was intended
to remain in effect for the thirty-year duration of the treaty.
See also R. Reid, supra note 18, at 111-36.
2 P.
Frye, A. Maxwell, K. Emery, and B. Ketchem, Ocean Science and
Marine Resources, in USES OF THE SEA 67 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).
27 See The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959 [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, U.N.T.S. 71, (entered into force for the U.S. June 23, 1961), arts. I, II, and Ii.
28G. Schatz, supra note 25, at 3.
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today involves the multinational character of the
gaged in scientific or other activities. "29
It is not uncommon for expeditions to include
least three different nationalities. This situation is
tinue with the advent of international cooperative
polar regions. As Skolnikoff suggests:

[Vol. 8: 204
personnel enpersons of at
likely to conefforts in the

Increasingly, new technologies are emerging that require the
participation or cooperation of many countries if the benefits
of technology are to be realized, or that have effects beyond national borders, or that are relevant primarily to areas outside
national jurisdictions, or that require investment beyond the
means of most or all nation-states acting individually. 3°
The potential for conflict among these multinational expeditions is even greater when one considers the effect that extremes
of the polar regions can have on an expedition's personnel,
causing friction, disputes and even crime.31
The situation is further complicated by the reality that private
individuals or groups, possessing the necessary financial resources, can now reach "these remote areas with or without the
'
It
permission or assistance of their national governments. -32
will be more difficult to control the activities of private expeditions
than those of a national group.
The informal and undefined dispute settlement framework of
the Antarctic Treaty is inadequate to settle even these personnel and multinational problems. When one is continents away
from the nearest court, the standard dispute settlement methods
For example, Marshall Myers notes
are not always feasible.
that the often inclement weather of the Antarctic creates practical
problems with regard to removing parties in need of disciplinary
He suggests that the lack of expeditious prosecution,
action.
the remoteness of witnesses from the courts, and the problems
29 K. Bertrand, supra note 2, at 15-16.

Skolnikoff, National and International Organization for the Seas, in USES
99 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).
K. Bertrand, supra note 2, at 15-16. Bertrand discusses this problem and

10E.

OF THE SEA
31

states:
The harsh environment of the polar regions places men, particularly
those from lower latitudes, under physiological and psychological stress.
This stress can lead to antisocial conduct or worse. Survival in polar
regions requires cooperative and concerted effort, a fact which the
natives of the Arctic have come to terms in their cultural mores. Personal failure to perform up to the accepted standards through inability or
negligence can have serious consequences for both the individual and the
group.
32

Id. at 18.
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in gathering evidence could "affect a nation's willingness to seek

justice.

"33

It will become evident that the Antarctic Treaty is inadequate
to handle future problems in this region. The treaty should,
however, be recognized as an important first step in international cooperation in the polar region. It, is indeed sobering to
note that the Arctic does not even have a basic agreement to
Both regions will suffer
cover present or future controversies.
tremendous growing pains unless institutions are developed to
deal with these potential conflicts.
It is clear that a Polar Regime with governing laws should be
formulated before an international crisis erupts. 34 There are
those who would resist any organizational efforts under the
banner of "freedom of the seas" or "freedom of science." Under
this type of laissez-faire approach, international conflicts - with
all the consequences - will arise, and no individual or nation will
benefit.
As Eugene Skolnikoff suggests, "When it becomes
technologically possible for one or a few nations to alter the entire earth's environment, perhaps irreversibly, or to destroy
resources known to be needed by others, freedom of unilateral
action may simply become unacceptable." 35 When technology
becomes available to many, limitation upon unilateral action
becomes necessary.
The machinery necessary for these efforts
can take many forms:
ranging from simple bilateral agreements to the creation of
supranational institutions to which jealously guarded national
prerogatives are delegated. If, however, there is a lesson to be
learned from this concept of a trend toward global technologies
it is that as new machinery is designed, or existing machinery
extended, for example, to perform functions related to the
oceans, nations must keep the larger picture in mind and recogto cope
nize that they must build an international regime able
36
with more than just a series of isolated requirements.
33M.

Myers, Operational Considerations: New Leal Issues, in SCIENCE,

NOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR REGIONS 28

TECH-

(G.Schatz ed. 1974).

34C. Ray, Ecoloqy, Law and the Marine Reiolution, in PACEM IN MARIBuS 2324 (E. Borgese ed. 1971). As Carlton Ray stated:
Much as we might wish it so, the sea is not a placebo for our destruction
of the land . . . .Nevertheless, one must agree with Belman (1968):
"Iflaw awaits developments, it loses the ability to shape them. ....It
is true that we do not as yet have all the knowledge we might desire, but
it is also true that we know enough now to be able intelligently to
monitor our actions.
35E.Skolnikoff, supra note 30, at 99.
36 Id.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
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The very nature of the ocean requires international cooperation if significant gains are to be made. Not only must research
cross international boundaries as in studies of currents and ice
floes, but significant research projects may require the expertise
of scientists of many nations with joint funding. The ocean itself moves endlessly and the bodies of water are so interconnected that:
. . . an observed volume of water may at some previous time
have been almost anywhere else in the ocean. The processes
that determine the dissolved substances in sea water are seldom
restricted to a local area. The structure of the sea floor reflects forces that are reshaping the entire planet. Marine
organisms are so interlinked that an element absorbed in the
food web at one location may reappear months later and
37
thousands of miles away.
Louis Henkin suggests that scientific research will benefit
by some regulation that will protect at least the equipment from
3
other ocean uses and establish uniformity in procedure. 1
It is evident that there is a need for some form of regulatory
and enforcement agency in the polar regions and that early action must be taken before vested interests solidify. As the question of sovereignty in the polar regions is unclear, it is most important that an international regime be established now while these
regions are still considered by many to be merely cold, remote
areas. Once nations have realized the potential of these areas
and have laid claim to them, it will be too late for a revision of
our policies. It will then be much more difficult to convince nations to give up their sovereign claims and national rights in exchange for an international regime. Because there are no entrenched ideas of sovereignty regarding the polar regions, there
is more hope for international understanding and cooperation in
this area of the law of the sea than in any other.
Following is a brief discussion of some of the existing laws
and institutions for the development of scientific research and
37 W.
MARIBUS

Wooster,

Oceanography and International Ocean Affairs,

in

PACEM

IN

61 (E. Borgese ed. 1971).

38 L. Henkin, Changing Law for Changing Sea, in USES OF THE SEA 77 (E.
Gullion ed. 1968). He states:
On the high seas research is free but it suffers some of the inadequacies
of laissez-faire. It suffers as well from undue concern for national

security ....
There are no arrangements for general cooperation, for
protecting buoys and scientific equipment.
Lack of uniformity in
research practices and in markings create dangers for both research and
navigation.
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law of the sea and an explanation of the applicability of those
principles to the unique conditions of the polar regions.
It has been suggested that there are several possible approaches to a development of a law of the sea. 39 One is a "wait
and see" approach which leaves exploitation to chance. Support
for this theory comes from the proponents of the case law method
and those who note our lack of knowledge and experience in the
sea. They would wait until this knowledge is developed further.
As mentioned earlier, this type of approach in the polar regions
would lead to the entrenchment of national interests and retardation of international cooperation.
The "flag" approach is supported mainly by military and
mineral interests of powerful nations. Under this approach the
sea would belong to no one initially, but later would be subject
to claims, along with some concessions either to an international
registry or toward cooperation in pollution and security. This
seems to many to be a form of neo-colonialism with emphasis on
competition rather than cooperation and ecology. It is this very
approach that is sought to be avoided by the formation of a Polar
Regime based on the concept of the sea as the common heritage
of all mankind.
The final alternative suggested is an "international" one calling for international efforts and regulation in lieu of national
ones.
Small and developing nations may view this approach as
the only legitimate one, or at least the one most likely to protect
their interests.
Something in line with this approach would
seem to have the best chance of acceptance by the international
community.4°
It is to avoid competition among nations for the resources of
the polar regions that an international governing regime must be
Several agencies of the United Nations are inestablished.
volved in various types of ocean research,41 but none focus on
the specific problems of the polar regions. Instead, these agencies
39 C. Ray, supra note 34, at 20.

Id. at 17. Ray's article goes on to state:
Ultimately man's activities within and beneath the sea must be legally
regulated. Griffin (1967) states: "To a large extent, a period of legal
The problem is ". . . to evolve policies and a
conjecture is ending."
legal regime which will maximize all beneficial uses of ocean space
...
. Under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the
prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of
colonial competition among the maritime nations."
41 See E. Skolnikoff, supra note 30, at 101-02 for further discussion of the
various U.N. agencies involved in ocean research.
40
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are oriented towards a specific field, as, for example, health or
agriculture. This approach is viewed as too fractionalized to be
either effective or efficient in the vast areas of the polar regions.
Another deficiency is that none of the agencies have any
42
effective machinery with regulatory or enforcement power.
Elizabeth Borgese in her introduction to the book, Pacem in
Maribus, discusses the two different schools of thought as to the
type of organization that should be embodied in an ocean regime. One school opts for the traditional "inter-national" organization that deals exclusively with nation-states rather than
enterprises or other nongovernmental or non-sovereign entities.
This proposition of a "two-tier" system would be added to the
concept. The basic concept is that an international organization
would first grant licenses to nations to engage in ocean projects.
These nations would, in turn, grant franchises to individual
enterprises. It has been argued that the "two-tier" system would
be simpler, require less machinery, and would more clearly fasten
responsibilities and liabilities where they belong; namely, on
the states. 43
The other approach would require the international organization to issue ocean licenses directly to the independent enterprise.
As Borgese says, "Considering the rapid advance of technological integration, the growing interdependence of the world market,
and the evolution of the huge multi-national corporations, one
may indeed come to the conclusion that the trend, during the
next twenty years, is such that resource exploitation by nationStates will become totally unrealistic." 44 It is felt that international law will be strengthened by the direct relationship
between the international regime and the enterprises.
This
approach also seeks to circumvent many of the problems of
sovereignty that are generally placed in the path of international
cooperation. It will be important to keep these two schools of
thought in mind when establishing the organizational structure of
the Polar Regime. Special consideration should be given as to
which type of organization would best suit the polar conditions.
President Nixon, on May 23, 1970, submitted a proposal on
the law of the sea that would have had all states renounce any
claims to a territorial sea beyond the 200-meter-isobath, recogniz42 C. Ray, supra note 34, at 17.
43 E.

1971).
44 Id.

Borgese,

Introduction, in

PACEM

IN

MARIBUS

xxiv

(E.

Borgese

ed.
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ing the area beyond this depth as the
kind" under an international regime.
suggest that the "international area"
"trusteeship zone" and an "international

"common heritage of manThe proposal went on to
would be divided into a
zone." The former would
be under the administration and responsibility of the coastal nation, while the latter would be under international administra45
tion.
This proposal has been criticized by those who feel that the
division of the ocean into different zones would cause more problems than it solves. The legal status of the trusteeship zone is
ill-defined and a new concept to other legal systems. It is also
said that this proposal discriminates in favor of some coastal
nations to the detriment of land-locked ones. 46 Though the
Nixon plan was not devised with the polar regions specifically
in mind, some of the ideas presented could prove useful in a polar
organization. For instance, it was proposed that the regime be
composed of three parts: a treaty, subsidiary regulations and
machinery. The treaty would contain the basic rules and principles, somewhat like the present Antarctic Treaty. The organization would have as one of its principle tasks the changing and
adopting of regulations in tune with new technology, and also
provide new regulations for areas that were not originally planned.
The machinery would be both regulatory and administrative and
would have four functions: "regulation; supervision of the execution of regulations and, if necessary, bringing parties before an
international tribunal; cooperation with existing international
organizations; and assistance to developing nations, with assurance of equal access and opportunity to all." ' 47 Though the idea
of dividing the ocean into zones would not apply to the polar
regions, the administrative and organizational ideas presented in
the Nixon proposal could be utilized in the development of a
polar regime.
The Antarctic Treaty could form the basis for a polar treaty
which would encompass the Arctic and its activities. The treaty
and the regime should incorporate the idea that the polar regions
are the common heritage of all. Ambassador Pardo, during one
of the Pacemn in Maribus preparatory conferences in Rhode Island
in 1970, suggested three characteristics of the "common heritage
of mankind":
45Id. at xxix.
46
17

Id.
Id.

at xxxi.
at xxx.
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First of all there is the 'absence of property'. The common
heritage engenders the right to use certain property, but not to
own it. It implies the management of property and the obligation of the international community to transmit the common
heritage, including resources and values, in historical terms.
Common heritage implies management. Management not in
the narrow sense of management of resources, but management
of all uses. Third, common heritage implies sharing of benefits.48

The ideas of lack of ownership, management of all uses, and
the sharing of benefits have been suggested in the present
Antarctic Treaty, but need to be expanded. It is suggested that
no claims to either region should ever be recognized. The management mechanism should coordinate all present activities and
remain flexible to incorporate other areas that may develop.
Benefits accrued through the endeavors of any one nation should
be available to all nations, especially in the field of scientific
research.
The Antarctic Treaty has several provisions dealing with the
sharing of scientific information.

Article III states, " . . . the

Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and
practicable

....

" plans

for

scientific

programs

will be

ex-

changed to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations
and that scientific personnel should be exchanged between expeditions and stations. It provides further that scientific observations and results shall be exchanged and made freely available.
The problem with these provisions is that they are worded as suggestions and are not the mandatory conditions that are necessary
in any Polar Regime seeking to avoid conflicts and provide benefits to all. All scientific research plans and final reports should
be published and made available to all interested parties. Multinational expeditions, with costs shared among the participants,
should be encouraged so as to facilitate a cross-fertilization of
ideas and an expansion of projects. Additionally, "there is at
times the idealistic motivation that by bringing together people
from different countries to work together world peace is encouraged.

"'49

The following criteria for research stated in the recent U.N.
Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed 50 could be con48E. Borgese, Preface to The Emerging Ocean Regime, in PACEM IN MARIBUS
161-62 (E. Borgese ed. 1971).
49A. King, International Cooperation in Science and Technology, in PACEM IN
MARIBUs 74 (E. Borgese ed. 1971).
50U.N. Doc A/8097, December 16, 1970.
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verted for use in the polar regions if the words "coastal state"
were changed to "Polar Regime." The criteria are:
(1) The coastal state [Polar Regime] shall be given prior
notification with a full description of the objectives, methods
and timing of the research work intended.
(2) Representatives of (or observers nominated by)5l the
coastal state [Polar Regime] are2 invited to participate in, and
5
to inspect, all research activities.
(3) The investigators agree to publish all results and to send
copies or records of all data, samples, etc. (where economically
feasible) to the coastal state [Polar Regime].
(4) Submersibles, research bouys and other unmanned devices may be used for a limited period, provided that other traditional uses of the area are not unduly affected.
The fulfillment of these conditions by the applicant would
automatically result in the obligation of the coastal state [Polar
53
Regime] to grant permission.
There should be a presumption of acceptance of the research
projects, but, as an alternative, an organization like the International Council of Scientific Unions could be used to certify

bona fide research agencies or expeditions in order that the regime could then automatically grant permission to carry out research.54 It should be stressed, however, that no project should be

permitted by the regime that would upset the delicate eco-system
of the polar regions.
It is clear that some type of governing council is necessary to
carry out the administrative functions of the regime. The Nixon
proposal of May 1970, suggested an assembly in which all mem-

bers would be represented. A smaller council which would
balance the interests of the industrial powers and the developing
nations could be formed. There would be a series of operating
commissions dealing with different areas, some with regulatory

or supervisory duties, in order that both power and responsibility are divided. The proposal would also provide for an International Maritime Court.55 This approach seems to be too frags Article VII of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959 entitles the contracting parties
to have observers who can inspect all areas of Antarctica including stations,
ships, aircraft, equipment and personnel.
52 U. Jenisch, A
Comparative Study of Current Draft Conventions and Proposals
for a New Ocean Regime, in FROM THE LAW OF THE SEA TOWARDS AN OCEAN
SPACE REGIME

144-45 & n.15 (E. Bohme and M. Kehden eds. 1972).

ssThis criterion has been introduced by Article 5 para.1 of the Geneva
Shelf Convention. Id. at 144-45 & n.16.
54Id.

55E. Borgese, supra note 43, at xxx.
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mented and its decision-making process too diffused to be sufficiently effective for the polar regions, although it must be
remembered that the plan was proposed for the entire ocean rather
than the smaller polar regions.
Skolnikoff, in his article, Uses of the Sea, suggests a more
effective arrangement:
Some analysts have noted a pattern in which those organizations
whose procedures allow executive action through some kind of
governing committee of limited membership, instead of a onecountry, one-vote governing body, are apparently more effective
and less bureaucratic5 6
Perhaps a limited governing council should be established, with
elected representatives and with the requirement that no two representatives are to be of the same country. The need for participation by the developed and developing nations in the governing
process should be recognized if the council is not to be viewed
with suspicion and hostility. The council would set up regulations
and supervise the activities in the area. Any disputes that arise
could be settled through a marine court or by arbitration. Arbitration would seem to be a fast and flexible way to handle any
disputes that might arise among nations in the polar regions.
Arbitration may be amenable to more nations because it gives
them the freedom to choose the arbitrator whom they feel they
can trust. In turn, they may feel they have more of an opportunity to be fairly heard than would be accorded in a fixed court
which may be of a fixed persuasion toward certain areas or
activities. Whatever the nature of the dispute settlement mechanism, the important point is that some mechanism is necessary
to handle any conflicts before they have gone too far. As Jenisch
states, "It is understood that this concept requires impartial institutions for the settlement of disputes within fixed time limits."57
Because there are no entrenched ideas of sovereignty in the
polar regions, it may be easier to form a Polar Regime than an
ocean regime.
It is hoped that as soon as an ocean regime
emerges, the Polar Region will become but a part of this larger
scene and not remain a separate entity. It must be remembered that the ocean, only when viewed as a whole, forms a
56

E. Skolnikofd, supra note 30, at 102.

Bouchez, The Legal Regime of Scientific Research on the Seabed, Proceedings
of the Symposium on the International Regime of the Seabed (Rome 1970), in FROM THE
57

LAW

OF THE SEA

TOWARDS

and M. Kehden eds. 1972).

AN

OCEAN

SPACE

REGIME

605 & n.18 (E. Bohme

1976]

POLAR REGIONS

219

complete working system. Skolnikoff advises, "The precedents
established now, the patterns of international operation allowed to
develop, the fundamental strength and viability of international
organizations, are all critical elements not just to determine a regime for the oceans for the next few years, but in laying the basis
for the future organization of an increasingly interdependent
world. "58
JOAN E. MOORE
58E. Skolnikoff, supra note 30, at 99-100.

